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Asymmetric effects of favorable and unfavorable information on decision-making 
under ambiguity 
 
 
Alexander Peysakhovich	  † and Uma R. Karmarkar	  †  
 
 
Most daily decisions involve uncertainty about outcome probabilities arising from 
incomplete knowledge, i.e. ambiguity. We explore how the addition of partial information affects 
these types of choices using theoretical and empirical methods. Our experiments in both gain and 
loss domains demonstrate that when such information supports a favorable outcome, it strongly 
increases valuation of an ambiguous financial prospect. However, when information supports an 
unfavorable outcome, it has significantly less impact. We find that two mechanisms drive this 
asymmetry.  First, unfavorable information decreases estimates of a good outcome occurring, but 
also reduces aversive uncertainty. These factors act in opposition, minimizing the effects of 
unfavorable information. Second, when information can be subjectively interpreted, unfavorable 
information is less likely to be integrated into evaluations. Our findings reveal mechanisms not 
captured by traditional models of decision-making under uncertainty and highlight the importance 
of increasing the salience of unfavorable information in uncertain contexts to promote unbiased 
decision-making.  
 	  
 † These authors contributed equally to this work
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Introduction 
When a trader contemplates the value of a stock, or a manager chooses a potential 
direction for company policy, their decision process rests on evaluating uncertain outcomes. 
Uncertainty has been characterized using two dimensions: risk, the probability of a given 
outcome, and ambiguity, the (un)availability of necessary information to estimate these 
probabilities. Beyond distaste for risk, individuals also tend to be ambiguity averse in a way that 
has seemingly irrational effects on decision-making (e.g. Ellsberg 1961, Camerer & Weber 1992, 
Trautmann & van de Kuilen 2013). Much is known about how individuals respond to varying 
levels of information in risky choices (e.g. shifts in probabilities; Camerer 1995, Kahneman & 
Tversky 2000). However, it remains unclear how varying levels of available (but incomplete) 
information affect decisions under ambiguity.  In particular, in many situations it is possible for 
an individual to receive partial information that is favorable or unfavorable to their desired 
outcome, or even open to subjective interpretation. Such information may change the estimated 
probability of a preferred outcome, but may also affect the perceived degree of aversive 
ambiguity, making its impact difficult to predict. Here we employ experiments using financial 
gambles to study how decision-makers integrate different categories and levels of incomplete 
information to estimate value in ambiguous decisions. 
To guide this work, we first adapt a simple model of ambiguity aversion to situations in 
which levels of ambiguity can vary continuously. The model predicts that favorable information 
(which supports a desired outcome) should have a larger impact on evaluations than unfavorable 
information (which supports an undesired outcome). We test these predictions using paradigms 
adapted from the “ball and urn” setup introduced by Ellsberg (1961), and commonly used in other 
experimental work (e.g. Fox & Tversky 1995, Halevy 2007, Levy et al. 2010, Tymula et al. 2012 
etc. ). In our experiments, outcomes of gambles depend on the color of a poker chip drawn from a 
bag. The contents of each bag are fixed, but participants receive only partial information about 
the composition. We vary the levels of this information parametrically from none (full ambiguity) 
to complete (no ambiguity). We also consider a second, more subjective, paradigm in which 
individuals evaluate ambiguous gambles based on the truth of a given trivia statement. Again, we 
vary the information that individuals receive about the potential veracity of the trivia. 
We find support for the model’s predictions such that favorable information has a larger 
effect on behavior than unfavorable information in the domain of gains (experiments 1, 2) and the 
domain of losses (experiment 3). We further demonstrate that this asymmetry persists when the 
decisions are incentive compatible, and when they are centered on the evaluation of subjective 
declarative statements (as opposed to numerical information; experiment 4). In experiment 5, we 
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provide insight into the psychological mechanisms driving this behavior. Our findings show that 
evaluations of an ambiguous gamble are driven not only by the estimated likelihood of a positive 
outcome occurring (as in a standard expected utility, or EU, model) but also by the certainty with 
which the decision-maker feels they can estimate this probability. We show that unfavorable 
information decreases estimates of a desired outcome occurring, but that it also reduces aversive 
uncertainty. These two effects have opposing effects on the decision-maker’s valuations and 
result in minimizing the overall impact of unfavorable information.   
In a final set of analyses we examine mechanisms implied by a range of theories of 
information processing under uncertainty. Our model includes an assumption of Bayesian 
updating: that all information is incorporated in a rational manner. However, there is significant 
evidence for both optimistic and pessimistic biases when information can be subjectively 
interpreted (e.g. Lord et al. 1979, Peeters & Czapinski 1990, Jain and Maheswaran 2000, 
Baumeister et al. 2001, Russo et al. 2004, Rozin & Royzman 2006). In our analyses, we indeed 
find evidence for optimism bias when information needs to be subjectively interpreted, but not in 
experiments where the partial information is numerical. Taken together, our findings represent 
new insight into “nonstandard” responses to information in ambiguous decisions.  
 
Ambiguity Aversion and Partial Information 
Theoretical models of human decision-making under uncertainty often rely on subjective 
expected utility theory (Savage 1971) combined with Bayesian updating. Specifically, individuals 
begin with prior beliefs over possible states of the world and use incoming information to update 
these priors in accordance with Bayesian inference (Kreps 1998). To make decisions, individuals 
use these (updated) beliefs to form an expectation of possible outcomes and make a choice that 
yields the highest expected utility. 
A key challenge to this model of decision-making comes from the Ellsberg paradox 
(Ellsberg 1961). As a generalized description, suppose participants are presented with a container 
of 100 poker chips, all of which are either red or blue.  They are asked for their willingness to pay 
(WTP) to play a game in which they guess the color of a chip drawn from the bag at random. 
Players win a monetary reward if the color of the drawn chip matches their guess, but receive 
nothing if it does not. On average, individuals are willing to pay more in situations when there is 
no ambiguity.  For example, if a person has the knowledge that a bag contains exactly 50 red and 
50 blue poker chips (no ambiguity) they value it more highly than a bag where they have no 
information about its contents (complete ambiguity). This occurs even though individuals 
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maintain the same risk estimate for a chip of their color being drawn, contrary to the predictions 
of SEU theory.  
We now model an environment in which levels of ambiguity arising from the amounts of 
both favorable and unfavorable information can vary continuously.  This allows us to formalize 
how differing amounts of partial information may affect ambiguous decisions. To do so, we have 
chosen a particular model of ambiguity aversion used in previous experimental work: a version of 
the maximin model of Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989).1  
Consider a decision-maker (DM) facing an ambiguous financial prospect (AFP): an AFP 
includes a single prize z, a set of states of the world represented here by the interval [0,1] and a 
winning function γ:[0,1] to [0,1]. Given a state of the world w, the probability of winning the 
prize z (i.e. the risk of the ambiguous prospect) is given by γ(w). The states are ordered such that 
γ is increasing, namely higher states always mean a (weakly) higher probability of winning the 
prize. 
The DM, or agent, does not know w but receives partial knowledge about what it could 
be. We restrict this to a particular kind of partial knowledge. Specifically, the DM can 
conclusively rule out that the state is less than some threshold X, thus we define X as the amount 
of favorable information. In addition, the DM can rule out that the state is greater than Y, thus we 
define Y as the amount of unfavorable information. The vector (X, Y, γ, z) completely 
parameterizes the AFP. We are interested in responses to information, so in the following 
discussion we fix the winning function and z. We suppress the dependence on γ and z in all later 
notation.  
The agent has no explicit information about the likelihood of states that are deemed 
possible. For intuition, the pair (X=0,Y=0) represents that the agent knows nothing about the 
possible state of the world, while (X=.5, Y=.5) means that the state of the world must be 
exactly .5. In comparison, (X=.25, Y=.25) means that the state must be somewhere in the interval 
[.25, .75] but the DM has no other information about what it could be. Restricting to this type of 
knowledge allows us to explicitly vary levels of ambiguity in our experimental designs. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  We choose this model because it is straightforward to work with and has been used in other experiments involving 
paradigms similar to ours (e.g. Levy et al. 2010, Tymula et al. 2012). We acknowledge that there are several other 
potential choices, including rank-dependent utility (Segal 1987), second-order expected utility (Grant et al. 2009), 
expected uncertain utility theory (Gul & Pesendorfer 2014), variational preferences (Maccheroni et al. 2006), smooth 
ambiguity models (Klibanoff et al. 2005) and others. At their core, each of these models captures ambiguity aversion 
by postulating that second-order uncertainty is somehow aversive. We conjecture that these models would generate 
similar behavioral predictions. Testing this conjecture, and the possibility that our results and experimental paradigm 
could also help to discriminate among these models provides an important avenue for future work.	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The DM evaluates an AFP as follows. The prize is worth utility u(z), which we set to be 1 
without loss of generality. The DM has a subjective probability distribution p(X,Y) on the set of 
all states. To build this distribution p(X,Y) we assume the DM begins with a full-support prior p0 
on the state space and updates it in accordance with Bayes rule given the knowledge (X,Y) he has.  
We now apply a version of the maximin utility function introduced in Gilboa & 
Schmeidler (1989). First, we simplify notation and let P(X,Y) be the DM’s subjective probability 
of winning the prize z given (X,Y). This can be derived from the primitives as follows:  
 
P(X,Y) = ∫γ(w)dp(X,Y) [eq. 1] 
 
We assume that p is well-behaved and so is continuously differentiable in X and Y. The 
DM’s utility for an AFP (X,Y) is  
 
W(X,Y) = (1-λ(X+Y))P(X,Y) [eq. 2] 
 
where λ(X+Y) is a smooth, decreasing function from [0,1] to [0,1] that has λ(1) = 0.  This 
means that if λ is identically zero, the DM acts as an EU agent. Note also in the case of uncertain 
decisions with no ambiguity (that is, when X + Y = 1) the DM also behaves as an EU maximizer. 
However, when X+Y is less than 1 the DM “downweights” the probability P(X,Y) and so behaves 
in an ambiguity averse manner.  
We can now look at the effects of changes in X and Y on evaluation in the AFP.2 In 
particular, we are interested how ambiguity averse (AA) agents differ from EU agents. Without 
making functional form assumptions on λ we cannot draw the exact form of their indifference 
curves; however, we can still show local properties of the agent’s evaluations. We now consider 
the comparative statics of the valuation of a prize with respect to X and Y. Fixing a knowledge 
level (X,Y) and differentiating gives us the marginal effects of favorable and unfavorable 
information: 
 
∂W(X,Y)/∂X =(1-λ(X+Y))∂P(X,Y)/∂X  - ∂λ(X+Y)/∂X*P(X,Y)[eq. 3] 
 
∂W(X,Y)/∂Y =(1-λ(X+Y))∂P(X,Y)/∂Y  - ∂λ(X+Y)/∂Y*P(X,Y) [eq. 4] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  We note here thatλrepresents a fixed preference (or aversion) to ambiguity and what we assume varies is the amount 
of ambiguity, not the individual’s attitude toward it.	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The comparative statics clearly show that two effects operate on AA DMs. We call these 1) the 
likelihood effect (captured mostly by the first term) and 2) the certainty effect (captured in the 
second term).  
The intuition behind this is as follows: favorable and unfavorable information change the 
estimates of winning P(X,Y) in the obvious directions but also reduce ambiguity (decrease λ
(X+Y)). Thus the net effect of changing X and Y depends on both of these elements. The 
likelihood and certainty effects push in the same direction for changes in X but in opposite 
directions for changes in Y.  
This stylized model allows us to draw the following specific hypotheses that can be tested 
behaviorally:  
 
H1: In evaluating AFPs, changes in favorable information (X) will have 
more impact on valuation than changes in unfavorable information (Y). 
 
This hypothesis, though simply stated, has the potential to cover a broad range of 
scenarios.  For example, we posit that the asymmetry between favorable and unfavorable 
information should persist in the domains of both gains and losses and across different 
specifications of AFPs. Thus we devote experiments 1-4 to establishing support for this 
hypothesis and its generalizability.  
While H1 predicts the overall expected behavioral outcomes, the model also motivates 
hypotheses about the potential underlying mechanisms.  It first suggests that individual’s 
valuation will depend on their assessed probability of a desirable outcome occurring (captured by 
P(X,Y)) as well as the amount of residual ambiguity of the situation (captured by λ(X+Y)). We 
refer to these two as subjective likelihood estimates and subjective certainty in what follows. This 
leads to our second hypothesis:  
 
H2: Subjective likelihood estimates and subjective certainty will have 
positive effects on valuation of AFPs. 
 
Further considering the shape of the functions allows us to make predictions about the 
effects of favorable and unfavorable information on other psychological variables. The subjective 
likelihood of winning the prize (i.e. P(X,Y)) is affected positively by X and negatively by Y. Felt 
certainty (i.e. 1-λ(X+Y )) increases in both X and Y. Note that this increase in certainty about the 
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situation should reduce its aversiveness, and also contribute to increases in WTP. This yields the 
following two hypotheses: 
 
H3a: Favorable (unfavorable) information will increase (decrease) 
subjective estimates of the likelihood of winning the prize.  
H3b: Both favorable and unfavorable information will increase felt certainty.  
 
Alternate accounts of biased information processing 
Stepping back from the formalization, a key assumption of our model is that the agent’s 
belief distribution incorporates information in a “neutral” manner (here modeled using Bayesian 
updating of a prior). Since Bayesian updating considers all information as equal, the model 
predicts no preferential bias towards the integration of one “type” of information. However, 
literature across multiple disciplines has shown that this prediction fails in several environments. 
Experiments on information integration in affectively charged domains such as political opinions 
(Lord et al. 1979, Westen et al. 2006) or consumer brand preferences (Jain and Maheswaran 2000, 
Russo et al. 2004) find a bias for confirming information, which supports existing attitudes, over 
conflicting information which counters them. Other findings suggest that positive information or 
feedback about one’s own desirable personal attributes is similarly overweighed (Sharot et al. 
2012, Eil & Rao 2012).  
In domains such as preference and attitude formation, a number of studies have also 
shown that a Bayesian updating prediction fails in the opposite direction.  In particular, negative 
information about a product or individual is given disproportionate consideration, sometimes 
even resulting in negative evaluations despite a clear majority of positive attributes (Peeters & 
Czapinski 1990, Baumeister et al. 2001, Rozin & Royzman 2006). Overall, these literatures raise 
the possibility that individuals may respond asymmetrically to information about gains and losses 
in the domain of ambiguity. However, the conflicting predictions give little insight into what kind 
of bias should be expected or how this might interact with individuals’ general aversion to 
ambiguity. Thus in addition to the model-driven predictions, we examine an additional 
exploratory hypothesis, motivated by the broader multidisciplinary study of information 
processing and valence asymmetries.  
 
H4: Individuals bias their information processing such that they directly 
overweight the contribution of favorable or unfavorable information under 
uncertainty. 
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We note that our predictions H1-H4 have the potential to conflict with one another, or to 
hold true in some decision contexts, but not others. Thus we tested these hypotheses in a series of 
behavioral experiments, summarized in Table 1. In each experiment, participants were presented 
with multiple AFPs. We varied the levels of favorable and unfavorable information available and 
investigated the effects of this variation on the participants’ subjective evaluations of the 
prospects, as measured by willingness to pay (or willingness to purchase).  
 
Experiment 1: Effects of partial information in the domain of gains 
To address the central hypothesis emerging from our model (H1), we examined how 
individuals valued hypothetical ambiguous gambles depending on partial information that 
supported or argued against a winning (desired) outcome.   
 
Methods 
One hundred and seventeen individuals (61% male, Mage=32.93) were recruited for this 
study via Amazon Mechanical Turk3 (AMT).  Compensation was fixed across participants, based 
on the estimated duration of the experiment, and independent of choices made or performance in 
the task. Participants provided informed consent in accordance with the IRB standards of the 
supporting university. They engaged in the central experimental task (see below) and then 
reported basic demographic information.  
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were asked basic comprehension 
questions about the rules of the experimental task. Seventeen participants were unable to 
successfully complete these questions, and were removed from the analysis, leaving a sample size 
of n = 100.  
Participants engaged in an experimental paradigm adapted from the paradox proposed by 
Ellsberg (1961). In this “pull-a-chip” game, they were informed that they were making choices 
about a bag of exactly 100 chips, each colored red or blue, and that one chip would be pulled 
from the bag at random. Participants were asked to imagine that drawing a red chip would result 
in winning $50, and that drawing a blue chip would result in winning nothing. The “pull-a-chip” 
game can be written formally using our model by discretizing the state space to be {0, 1, …, 100} 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The use of AMT for experimental research is relatively new and reflects a unique subject pool (e.g. Paolacci & 
Chandler 2014, Rand et al. 2014). Recent work demonstrates the validity of the experimental data collected with AMT 
for economic games involving hypothetical and minimal ($1) stakes (Amir & Rand 2012). Furthermore, behavior on 
AMT matches well with standard laboratory results on economic risk/gambling tasks (e.g. Fudenberg & Peysakhovich 
2014, Imas 2014).  
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with γ(w)= w/100. We implemented varying levels of knowledge by presenting participants with 
statements of the form: “You know that the bag contains at least X red chips and at least Y blue 
chips.” Thus X was the amount of favorable information, and Y was the amount of unfavorable 
information. X and Y were varied parametrically from 0 to 50 in increments of 25, creating 9 
possible levels of knowledge, or rounds.  
All participants entered their hypothetical willingness to pay (WTP) for tickets to play in 
each of the 9 rounds by moving a slider on a scale that ranged from $0 to $35 in $1 increments. 
Each round was presented on its own page, and participants had to indicate their responses before 
moving on to the next decision. For their first decisions, all participants evaluated rounds 
specified by (0,0) and (50,50) to allow for a direct test of the Ellsberg paradox across individuals.  
 
Results  
We examined the (0,0) and (50,50) gambles to benchmark our findings. Consistent with 
ambiguity aversion, average WTP was significantly lower for a ‘pull-a-chip’ bag with no chip 
information given at all (M= 4.22, SD=5.32) 4  compared to a ‘pull-a-chip’ bag with a known 
composition of 50 red chips and 50 blue chips (M=10.98, SD=8.78; t-test p<.001). We note that 
even though this design is hypothetical, the reported WTP matches well with existing work on 
ambiguity aversion in recent incentive compatible experiments (Tymula et al. 2012, see Appendix 
Section 1 for calibration details).  
We now turn to investigating the effects of partial information on reported WTP. Recall 
that red is the winning color. Thus, the number of red chips represents the amount of favorable 
information, and the number of blue chips represents the amount of unfavorable information 
received. Visualizing the data in Figure 1 appears to show that adding favorable information 
increases WTP more than adding equivalent amounts of unfavorable information decreases WTP. 
We ask whether this result survives statistical analysis. As a first cut, we used a reduced form 
model to estimate the average marginal effect of favorable vs. unfavorable information on WTP. 
We regressed WTP on the amount of favorable and unfavorable information present (e.g. the 
numbers of red and blue chips). The coefficients in these regressions can then be interpreted as 
average marginal effects of information type on WTP. Note that the design is such that both the 
number of red chips (X in our formalization) and the number of blue chips (Y) are drawn from 
the set {0, 25, 50}. As neither one exceeds 50, choosing a value for X (or Y) does not constrain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 M is used here and going forward as an abbreviation for “Mean”.   
10 
the other variable. Since participants enter decisions for each possible knowledge level, X and Y 
are uncorrelated variables in our regressions. 
These analyses (Table 2, column 1) revealed that favorable information had a large 
positive effect on WTP.  On average, adding a marginal red chip increased WTP by 13.3 cents. In 
contrast, unfavorable information had no (significant) effect (point estimate = .6 cents).  The 
absolute magnitude of unfavorable information’s effect was significantly smaller than the effect 
of favorable information (test for equality of regression coefficients p<.01) revealing a large 
asymmetry between the impact of different information types.  Since less than 2% of the 
decisions for any gamble include a WTP of 0, it is unlikely that our findings are due to censoring 
at 0 in the responses.  
In addition to the regression-based analysis, we appealed to the theoretical results derived 
in the model section to motivate a reduced form “difference-in-difference” analysis. First, let us 
fix an AFP and define WTP(X, Y) as the willingness to pay of an agent when she is faced with 
information levels given by (X, Y). Note that the simple model of ambiguity aversion implies that 
at any (X, Y) the marginal addition of favorable information should have a larger effect than the 
marginal addition of unfavorable information. Note that because this property always holds on the 
margin, it must also hold for any non-marginal quantity d. Thus, we should expect to see that an 
increase in favorable information by d should have a larger positive impact on WTP than the 
comparable negative impact from increasing unfavorable information by d. Formally this can be 
written as: 
 
 WTP(X+d, Y) – WTP(X,Y)  >  -(WTP(X, Y+d) – WTP(X,Y)) 
 
We use this basic fact to motivate our next hypothesis test. We initialize at a point (X,Y) 
and define two empirical quantities from our data:  
 
ΔPos(X,Y) = mean[WTP(X+25, Y)] – mean[WTP(X,Y)]  
and  
ΔNeg(X,Y) = mean[WTP(X, Y+25)] – mean[WTP(X,Y)] 
 
We then ask whether there is a stronger effect of increasing favorable information by 25 than by 
increasing unfavorable information by 25. Formally, we are testing the following: on average, 
over all possible starting positions, is mean[ΔPos(X,Y) + ΔNeg(X,Y)] > 0?  
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Performing the analysis showed that the empirical difference between ΔPos(X,Y) and 
ΔNeg(X,Y) is approximately $3.76. This is significantly different from 0, with a participant-level 
bootstrapped 95% confidence interval =  [2.93, 4.56]. Thus, both types of analyses show that 
favorable information has a greater impact on the valuation of financial prospects than equal 
amounts of unfavorable information.   
 
Experiment 2: Effects of Partial Information, Allowing for Choice of Winning Color 
In contrast to many prior experiments on ambiguity aversion (see Trautmann & van de 
Kuilen 2013 for a recent review), we pre-assign red as the winning color in experiment 1. We 
thus performed a second experiment in which participants were able to view the available 
information and select both their WTP and which color would correspond to a winning outcome.  
 
Methods 
One hundred and twenty-two individuals (59% male, Mage=31.89) were recruited for this 
study via AMT with general procedures (compensation, consent, and demographics) occurring as 
in experiment 1. Participants engaged in a “choice” version of the pull-a-chip task. The 
instructions explained that participants could buy a ticket to play in a game where 1) they would 
have selected the color for the winning chip and 2) a chip would be drawn at random from the 
bag. Given this procedure for the game itself, for each round, participants viewed information 
about the contents of the bag. They then indicated their WTP to play (by moving a slider on a $0-
$35 scale) and indicated the color they would choose if the round was played. At the beginning 
and end of the experiment, participants were asked basic comprehension questions about the rules 
of the experiment. Eleven participants were unable to successfully answer one of these questions 
and were removed from the analysis, leaving a sample size of n = 111.  
 
Results  
Given that participants selected the winning color each game, for each participant 
decision we designated information about the chosen (winning) chip color as “favorable” and 
information about the non-chosen chip color as “unfavorable”. We regressed WTP on the number 
of chips of the chosen winning color (#favorable) and number of chips of the non-winning color 
(#unfavorable) as in experiment 1. As shown in Table 2 (col.2), unfavorable information had a 
significantly smaller effect on WTP than favorable information (Test for equality of regression 
coefficients p<.01).  Thus we find support for H1 regardless of whether individuals themselves 
select which color will indicate a winning outcome.   
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Experiment 3: Effects of partial information in the domain of losses 
In experiments 1 and 2, a winning outcome resulted in a net financial gain (higher than 
the endowment) and a losing outcome resulted in receiving no gain (or “losing” only the ticket 
price.) However, in a context of uncertainty, reframing a gamble as a pure loss rather than a pure 
gain can lead individuals to engage in risk-seeking behavior (e.g. Kahneman & Tversky 1979, 
Kahneman & Tversky 2000). Somewhat relatedly, in the first two experiments, favorable 
information is highlighted by the gain frame of the decision.  Thus, though our findings are most 
consistent with overweighting favorable information, they cannot rule out the possibility that 
participants’ behavior is driven by overweighting the outcome-salient information (e.g. Wason 
1966).  Motivated by these issues, we conducted an additional experiment to examine whether 
our effects carried over to the domain of losses.  
 
Methods 
Sixty individuals (MAge = 33.35, 58% male) were recruited via AMT, with general 
procedures occurring as in experiment 1.  At the beginning and end of the experiment, 
participants completed attention checks consisting of copying text into a response box and 
answering basic comprehension questions about the rules of the experiment. Seven participants 
were unable to successfully complete at least one of these tasks, and were removed from the 
analysis, leaving a sample size of n = 53. 
  Participants engaged in a loss-based version of the pull-a-chip task. They began each of 
9 rounds with a hypothetical endowment of $50, and the assumption that at the end of a round a 
chip would be drawn from a bag of 100 red or blue chips. They were informed that if the drawn 
chip were red, they would lose their endowment, and if it were blue, they would keep their 
endowment. Participants were asked to report their WTP for an insurance ticket (using a slider 
from $0-35 in $1 increments), which would protect their $50 endowment if a red chip were drawn 
and have no effect otherwise. The nine rounds/knowledge levels were implemented in a manner 
identical to experiment 1. All participants completed all levels, creating a within-subject design. 
  
Results 
Note that the measure of WTP for insurance tickets in this experiment behaves in the 
opposite direction from gamble tickets in the first experiment. Thus, a more negative evaluation 
of the gamble (e.g. a higher chance of losing endowment) should increase WTP for insurance 
while a more positive evaluation (e.g. lower chance of losing endowment) should decrease WTP 
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for insurance.  
If our previously observed asymmetry is driven by a bias towards “confirming” or 
outcome-salient information, then a loss frame should lead to overweighting information that 
suggests that a loss is more likely. If the asymmetry is driven by a bias towards favorable 
information, it should lead to overweighting information that suggests a loss is less likely. 
Regressing WTP for insurance on the amount of no-loss (favorable) and loss (unfavorable) 
information revealed that the number of no-loss chips had a significant negative influence on 
WTP for insurance. In contrast, the number of loss chips had no significant effect (Table 2, col. 3). 
These data suggest our main effect specifically involves overweighting information about an 
individual’s favored outcome rather than the salient outcome. 
To explore whether participants show behavior consistent with interpreting our design as 
a loss frame, in Appendix Section 1 we calibrate individual level risk-aversion parameters as in 
experiment 1. We see that indeed individuals indeed display convex utility functions (ie. risk-
seeking behavior). Thus our evidence shows that overweighting favorable information appears to 
occur in the domain of loss, and suggests that it is not disrupted by loss aversion or the shift in the 
gambles’ reference point.  
 
Experiment 4: Subjective perceptions of information and incentive compatible gambles  
The findings in experiments 1-3 reflect hypothetical situations. However, decisions with 
real consequences can be more representative of daily decision-making, and can elicit stronger 
reactions than hypothetical scenarios (Bushong et al. 2010, Kang et al. 2011). In this study, we 
utilized a within-subject design with an incentive compatible valuation procedure and prizes that 
resulted in real monetary outcomes.  
To further widen the scope of our findings, we examined two additional types of 
ambiguous decision-making beyond pull-a-chip games.  First, we note that the “pull-a-chip” 
game includes both risk and ambiguity; here, perfect knowledge of a bag’s contents does not 
guarantee knowledge of whether the outcome would be a win or loss. As our model-derived 
theory applies to arbitrary AFPs, we included a “majority game” in which the AFP is a bag of 101 
poker chips (all red or blue). To determine the outcome, the bag is emptied and the color of the 
majority of the chips (>50) determines whether the participant has won or lost.  Here, because 
knowledge of the bag’s contents completely describes whether the outcome is a win or loss, the 
majority game includes ambiguity, but does not include risk.  
Second, in the games based on considering specific quantities of poker chips, there is 
little room for subjective interpretations of the information and there is a known cap on the 
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available amount of information.  To better understand whether our findings carried over to less 
“calculable” contexts, we tested how individuals processed more complex information related to 
real world trivia (see Methods below).  
 
General Methods 
Thirty-seven university students (MAge=21.8, 38% male) completed this in-person study 
at a computer laboratory with a known policy preventing the use of deception. They were seated 
individually at computer terminals, separated by dividers. Participants provided informed consent 
in accordance with the IRB standards of the supporting university. All participants received $10 
in compensation for participating in the study. In addition, they were endowed with 25 points at 
the start of the experiment, with the potential to spend those on game rounds where winning 
outcomes yielded 30 points. Points were translated into dollars at the end of the experiment (at a 
rate of 4 to 1), allowing participants to earn up to approximately $14 depending on their choices 
and the gamble outcomes. The experiment consisted of two parts: (1) AFPs based on poker-chip 
games and (2) ambiguous gambles based on trivia items (see 4A and 4B below). Each part was 
subdivided into rounds.  
Across the experiment, true WTP was elicited via a version of the Becker-DeGroot-
Marschak (BDM) procedure (Becker et al. 1964). Participants were given an endowment of 25 
points at the start of each round, and asked to enter in any amount of this as their WTP. At the 
start of the experiment, they were given detailed instructions explaining that their indicated WTP 
would be compared with a price randomly generated by the computer. If the computer’s price was 
higher than their stated WTP, they retained the full endowment for that round. If the computer’s 
price was lower, they bought the ticket out of their endowment for that price.  To prevent 
“portfolio building” only one round of the experiment (from parts A and B combined) was chosen 
to count for real money and was actually played at the end of the experiment for each participant. 
Participants received no feedback on any of their choices until this time. Participants’ choices 
were honored based on the outcome, and cash payouts were delivered accordingly.  
To address any potential concerns about experimenter dishonesty, the winning color (red 
or blue) for each poker-chip gamble was chosen randomly. Participants were informed of this 
design, as well as the reasons behind it. A similar outcome-assignment randomization method 
was used in the trivia-based gambles. 
 
Experiment 4A.  
Methods  
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Participants evaluated both pull-a-chip games and “majority games” in which they made 
choices about bags of poker chips, with all chips colored red or blue. At the start of a round, 
participants were informed of that round’s (randomly chosen) “winning color”.  For pull-a-chip-
games, participants were informed they would win 30 points if a randomly drawn chip from the 
bag matched the winning color. For majority games rounds, winning was determined by 
emptying the bag at the completion of the experiment. Here, participants would win 30 points if 
the majority of the chips out of the 101 in the bag matched the winning color, and receive nothing 
otherwise. The majority game can be written formally in our framework by letting the state space 
be {0, 1, …, 101} and the winning function is described by γ(w)= 0 if w<51 and γ(w)= 1 
otherwise.  
Knowledge levels were implemented as in experiment 1. Each participant made a total of 
18 choices (9 levels of knowledge x 2 types of games). The rounds were presented in random 
order with the following exception: the first evaluation for all participants was the pull-a-chip bag 
whose contents were known to be 50 red chips and 50 blue chips and their second evaluation was 
the pull-a-chip bag with no information. For each pull-a-chip and majority bag presented to them, 
participants indicated how much they would be willing to pay for a ticket to play in that gamble 
using a text entry box. Additionally, participants were asked for their confidence that they would 
win each game.  
Upon entering the experimental room, participants viewed 18 real bags that had each 
been filled with poker chips accurately corresponding to the information given in for each round.  
Participants had their attention specifically directed to these bags both in their written instructions 
as well as verbally by the experimenter. Though participants were not able to view the contents of 
the bags, a randomly chosen bag was shaken to demonstrate that it did contain poker chips. These 
bags remained present in the room for the duration of the experiment to address any concerns 
about the “real” nature of the gambles, or experimenter deception.  
 
Results 
Our data was again consistent with standard predictions of ambiguity aversion: WTP for 
a pull-a-chip bag with no information (M=6.27, SEM = .88) was significantly lower than that for 
a pull-a-chip bag with a known composition of 50 red and 50 blue chips (M=10.40, SEM =.86; t-
test p<.001). Levels of risk aversion and ambiguity aversion behavior were consistent with other 
recent empirical papers (see Appendix Section 1 for calibration and discussion). 
Regressing WTP on the amounts of favorable and unfavorable information showed that 
the asymmetric effects of favorable and unfavorable information persisted for pull-a-chip games 
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under incentive compatible conditions (Table 3 col. 1; Test for equality of regression coefficients’ 
magnitudes p< .01). We observed this asymmetry in the majority game as well (Table 3 col. 2; 
Test for equality of regression coefficients’ magnitudes p < .01). Thus our results replicate across 
numerous samples, and hypothetical and incentive compatible contexts.5 As before, the effect 
cannot be explained by censoring, as only 12% of WTP decisions are zero and the effect is robust 
to using a Tobit regression. Furthermore, repeating the difference-in-difference analysis detailed 
in experiment 1 similarly showed that increasing favorable information by 25 chips had a larger 
impact than increasing unfavorable information by 25 (difference = 3.76, bootstrapped 95% 
confidence interval: [2.92, 4.63]).  
 
Experiment 4B 
Hsu et al. (2005) show that both behavior and neural activity in trivia-based ambiguous 
gambles are very similar to standard Ellsberg-based designs.	  To examine how our observed 
biases might manifest in such a context with more “subjectively” interpretable information, 
participants from experiment 4A also engaged in the following decisions. 	  
  
Methods 
Participants judged gambles dependent on trivia drawn from categories such as sports, 
geography, finance, weather and knowledge of cities, along with up to two relevant facts (e.g. Fig. 
2A, see Appendix Section 2 for all questions and facts used in the experiment). To rule out 
participant concerns related to unfair experimental conditions or “rigging”, trivia items were 
always in the form of whether a particular quantity (e.g. value of the DOW in a given year) was 
above or below some threshold. To prevent the threshold from acting as a signal, the winning 
“direction” (above or below) was randomly assigned at the question level (e.g. for all participants 
roughly half of the trivia reflected “above” and half reflected “below”). Participants were 
informed of this randomization both verbally and in their written instructions. 
All individuals saw 10 pieces of trivia (see Appendix Section 2 for listing) in a random 
order. For each trivia item, they were randomly assigned to see either 0,1 or 2 related facts. 
Participants were informed that if the trivia statement was true, they would win additional money. 
If it was false, they would win nothing. After indicating their WTP to play each trivia gamble 
(using the same BDM procedure as 4A), participants rated their confidence that they would win 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 We note that the size of the asymmetry is different between our hypothetical and incentive compatible experiments. 
This could be due to the incentivized nature of our lab replication or due to changing subject pools (individuals on 
AMT vs. mostly Harvard undergraduates). Though these findings do not reveal the exact nature of the moderators, they 
illustrate that the asymmetry between favorable and unfavorable information appears to be quite robust. 
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on a scale of 1 [Not very confident] to 7 [Extremely confident] as well as how knowledgeable 
they felt about the topic of the trivia question on a scale of 1 [Not very knowledgeable] to 7 
[Extremely knowledgeable].  When participants received facts along with the trivia, they 
categorized those facts as favorable (“This fact makes me think that it is more likely that the trivia 
is true”), unfavorable (“This fact makes me think that is it less likely that the trivia is true”) or 
neutral/unimportant (“This fact does not help me make any judgment on the trivia”).  
 
Results 
To analyze the effect of information in the trivia games, we used the subjective 
categorization of the related facts as favorable or unfavorable at the individual level. We excluded 
facts rated as neutral/unimportant being excluded (approximately 66% of presented facts were 
rated as favorable or unfavorable). We pooled the analysis across the 10 trivia items. Figure 2B 
shows that information categorized as favorable once again exerted a strong positive effect on 
WTP while information categorized as unfavorable had a negative but weaker effect. Regression 
analysis (Table 3) revealed that the effect of favorable information was significantly larger than 
the effect of unfavorable information (absolute magnitude=38%, Test for equality of regression 
coefficients p<.01). This analysis is robust to the addition of demographic controls (see Appendix 
Section 1). 
This design is a strong test of the asymmetric effects of favorable information on value. 
Participants state that information they categorize as unfavorable makes them think that the trivia 
item is less likely to be true. However they do not appear to adjust their WTP nearly as much as 
in response to such unfavorable information as they do in response to favorable information. We 
also found no significant impact of information on perceived knowledgeability of the topic, 
suggesting that information is not simply increasing familiarity with the general trivia domain 
(see Appendix Section 1).  
As a robustness check, we also looked for relationships between poker-chip and trivia 
behavior. To do this we calibrated a two parameter (risk aversion, ambiguity aversion) power-
utility based function at the individual level using part 1 data. We found that individual level risk 
aversion correlated positively with WTP for trivia gambles while calibrated individual-level 
ambiguity aversion correlated negatively, providing confirmation that the trivia based gambles 
indeed seem to tap into individual preferences for risk and ambiguity. For full details of the 
structural estimation and the accompanying analysis, see the Appendix (Section 1). 
 Overall, experiments 1-4 have provided strong support for H1. In particular, across a 
variety of domains, favorable information has a much stronger effect on valuations of AFPs than 
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unfavorable information. Our trivia experiment demonstrates that this effect holds in situations in 
which the information provided is “subjective,” or non-numerical, and thus less open to 
calculations. Given this support for our proposed model, we turned to investigating hypotheses 
H2-H4 and the psychological mechanisms underlying this behavioral effect.  
 
Experiment 5: Information and aversive uncertainty 
The nature of ambiguity aversion suggests a mechanism underlying our observed 
asymmetry: namely a powerful aversion to ignorance (e.g. Fox & Tversky 1995, Frisch & Baron 
1988).   In our experiments, individuals are aware that they are using incomplete information to 
estimate outcome probabilities. Thus they are aware that these estimates may not be accurate. Our 
model suggests that increases in the subjective likelihood of a winning outcome and increased felt 
certainty in estimates of outcome likelihoods should increase valuation of AFPs (H2), and thus 
WTP. 
Hypotheses 3A and B, motivated by our model, specify how information should affect 
these two variables and how they would drive our main behavioral findings. They indicate that 
favorable information has two potentially positive effects: increasing the subjective probability of 
a good outcome and also increasing felt certainty. They also predict that unfavorable information 
has two effects that potentially act in opposition. Unfavorable information can decrease the 
subjective probability of a good outcome, but it can also increase felt certainty, releasing 
individuals’ aversion to ignorance. Thus unfavorable information’s net impact on WTP is reduced. 
Figure 3 summarizes this model in the form of a directed graph, which is tested in the following 
study.  
 
Methods 
Twenty-nine university students from the local metropolitan area participated in this 
experiment (Mage=21.85, 60% male)6 in a computer laboratory with a known policy preventing 
the use of deception. Participants provided informed consent in accordance with the IRB 
standards of the supporting university and received $15 in monetary compensation for 
participation. Detailed instructions were provided for each element of the experimental task. 
Individuals were presented with two blocks of 50 pull-a-chip rounds (for a total of 100 rounds) in 
a within-subject design. This large number of rounds allows us to verify whether our effect is 
robust to experience with the decision problem. Rounds were generated randomly as follows: we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Four participants declined to give their gender and two participants declined to give their age in the post-
experimental questionnaire. The reported compositions include only those who reported this information.	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started with a ‘center’ from the set (0,0), (50, 0), (0, 50) and (50,50). We then added uniformly 
distributed noise with support in the interval [-20, 20] to both favorable and unfavorable chips, 
keeping the total number of revealed chips always at 100 or below. The Appendix (Section 3) 
shows a full list of generated rounds.  
This experiment was fully incentive compatible and conducted at relatively high stakes. 
Independent from their compensation for participation, participants received a $16 endowment in 
bills placed at their terminals. They were directed to take this money, and informed they could 
use it to purchase tickets for a lottery. Tickets won $30 if a red chip was drawn and had no effect 
otherwise.  
The experiment proceeded in two blocks of 50 rounds that were presented in random 
order. In one block of 50 rounds (referred to as valuation rounds) participants indicated their 
WTP for a ticket to a randomly generated ambiguous prospect using the BDM procedure from 
experiment 4. For the other block, participants purchased tickets in a different way. There is some 
evidence that WTP elicitations in ambiguous settings may lead to biased results (e.g. Maafi 2011, 
Trautmann et al. 2011). In addition, it could be possible that incentive compatibility in the BDM 
is based on some notion of probabilistic sophistication while many theories of ambiguity aversion 
are based on relaxing this assumption. To aid in addressing these potential confounds, in the other 
block of 50 rounds (referred to as purchase rounds) participants made a binary decision to buy or 
not buy a randomly generated ambiguous lottery at a fixed price of $10. This decision was made 
using an 8 point scale ranging from -4 [Definitely not purchase] to 4 [Definitely purchase]. Any 
answer above 0 would result in a purchase of the ticket for $10 if the round in question was 
chosen, while any answer below 0 would leave the participants with no lottery and their full $16 
endowment. We used the additional scale points to gain insight into how strongly participants felt 
about their purchasing decision.  Participants were informed that failing to indicate a choice 
above or below zero would result in the outcome being decided at random if the round was 
selected to count for incentive compatibility.  
After making their WTP or willing-to-purchase decision, participants indicated their 
estimate of the likelihood that a red or blue chip would be drawn using a, 9 point scale with the 
endpoints of “Red for Sure” and “Blue for Sure”.  The neutral midpoint was explicitly labeled as 
“Either color is equally likely.” Participants also indicated their certainty by answering how 
“certain they felt their estimate was accurate” using a Likert scale from 1 [Not very certain] to 9 
[Extremely certain].  Participants were given detailed instructions on how to answer the 
likelihood and certainty questions, including having the distinction between likelihood and 
certainty illustrated by the following examples: 
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1) A fair coin flip – (equal likelihood and high certainty) 
2) A sporting event with unknown teams (potentially equal likelihood, low certainty)  
 
To summarize, for each round, participants indicated a ticket-buying response (WTP or 
willingness to purchase), a likelihood rating, and a certainty rating.  
 
Results 
Figure 4 shows mean WTP elicited by the BDM procedure for each of 50 randomly 
generated levels of favorable information grouped by whether there is a high (>25 unfavorable 
chips) or low (<25 unfavorable chips) level of unfavorable information. Together with this data, 
regression analyses of the WTP responses demonstrated that favorable information had a 
significantly larger effect on WTP than unfavorable information (Table 4, col. 1; absolute 
magnitude = 25%, test for equality of regression coefficients p<.01). This effect also held in the 
willingness-to-purchase decisions using the purchase scale as a continuous variable and also 
using a binary “yes” (>0 on the scale) and “no” (or < 0 on the scale) decision (Probit regressions, 
Table 4, columns 2 and 3).  Thus our central findings regarding the asymmetry between the 
effects of favorable and unfavorable information replicate when individuals are considering 
meaningful financial stakes, and across different types of value elicitation measures.  
We can also test whether familiarity with the decision problem alters the asymmetry 
towards favorable information.  Restricting our analyses to only the last 25 rounds of the WTP 
block (which is the first block for some participants, and second for others) we find that favorable 
information still has a greater effect than unfavorable information (Table 4, column 4). This 
suggests our effects persist even when the individual has experience with this type of decision-
making.  
We next examined the potential mechanisms underlying the apparent bias towards 
favorable information. Figure 5 illustrates how in valuation rounds, both increases in the 
estimated likelihood of a red-chip outcome and increases in the certainty of that estimate cause 
increases in WTP. This is in line with the predictions of H2 (see Appendix Section 4 for 
analogous figures for purchase rounds).  Similarly, these likelihood and subjective certainty 
measures each had their own strong positive effect on WTP (5, column 1) and willingness to 
purchase (Table 4, column 2, 3) when measured in regressions controlling for both variables.  
Given that estimated likelihood and certainty showed a similar impact on both valuation 
and purchase, we pooled the data across all of the experimental rounds to examine the effects of 
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favorable and unfavorable information on these elements7. As hypothesized (H3a), favorable 
information increased estimated likelihood of a winning chip and unfavorable information 
decreased it (ordered Probit estimates Table 6 column 1).  Furthermore, as predicted by our 
model and H3b, both favorable and unfavorable information significantly increased felt certainty 
(ordered Probit estimates Table 6, column 2).  
The same effects of information, likelihood, and certainty on WTP replicate when tested 
with hypothetical stakes on a larger more diverse sample (see Appendix Section 5). Taken as a 
whole, this experiment shows that perceived likelihood and certainty play a driving role in 
defining how favorable and unfavorable information influence the perceived value of an 
ambiguous prospect (H2, H3a,b).  In addition the results further demonstrate the robustness of our 
central findings (H1) across high stakes and hypothetical ones, experience with the decision 
problem, and across decision types (e.g. WTP and willingness-to-purchase).  
 
Addressing Biased Integration of Information  
Our model is based on Bayesian updating, and thus unable to speak to the kind of biased 
integration of information found in a wide variety of psychological studies (e.g. Lord et al. 1979, 
Peeters & Czapinski 1990, Jain and Maheswaran 2000, Baumeister et al. 2001, Russo et al. 2004, 
Rozin & Royzman 2006). While it is clear that our findings do not support a pessimism or loss-
weighting bias, they do not address theories of motivated reasoning or optimism biases. The 
measures used in experiment 5 allow us to take a first look at whether such biases occur in our 
data. Comparing the effects of favorable and unfavorable information on reported likelihood 
ratings reveals little, if any, asymmetry (ordered Probit coefficient on favorable information 
= .430, coefficient on unfavorable information = -.446).  
Research documenting biased information processing generally uses “subjective” 
information that requires some amount of interpretation. The numerical information in poker chip 
games is more concrete, and potentially more “objective”, and thus possibly resilient to optimism 
(or pessimism effects). In contrast, the trivia games in experiment 4B do involve substantial 
subjective interpretation.  Thus we explore the robustness of our model’s initial assumptions and 
test whether individuals do indeed overweight the contribution of favorable or unfavorable 
information (H4) in the data from that study.  
We base our analysis on the following observation: theories of motivated reasoning or 
optimism bias would predict that the supporting information or facts would be evaluated 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Pooling data for estimated likelihood and subjective certainty is possible because these measures are conducted in the 
same way regardless of whether the round is valuation or purchase.  
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differently by gamblers in the trivia experiment than by individuals who had nothing at stake. To 
gather data for the latter group, we recruited n=86 individuals from AMT to take part in a 
“control” survey which was completely independent of any financial stakes or measures. 
Compensation was fixed across participants, based on the estimated duration of the experiment, 
and independent of choices made or performance in the task. Participants provided informed 
consent in accordance with the IRB standards of the supporting university. Participants were 
presented with a “non-directional” or neutral statement based on the trivia from experiment 4B. 
As an illustration, the example in Figure 2A stating  “…the high temperature in San Diego, CA 
on April 28, 2010 was ABOVE 66 degrees” became “…the high temperature in San Diego, CA 
on April 28, 2010 was ABOVE or BELOW 66 degrees.” Participants were given the same related 
facts that had been offered to “gamblers” in the lab experiment, and were asked to indicate which 
direction they supported (e.g. “This fact makes me think that the temperature was more than 66 
degrees”) or classify the facts as neutral (“This fact doesn't help me evaluate this statement.”)  
We coded directional ratings as +1 if the participant said that the fact made the “more 
than” side of the statement more likely, -1 if they said that the fact made the “less than” side more 
likely and 0 if they stated that the fact was neutral. Each fact was then labeled as “objectively 
more” if its average rating was significantly positive, “objectively less” if its average rating was 
significantly negative, and neutral if its rating was not statistically different from 0. Out of the full 
set of 20 facts (2 per trivia statement) we found that 15 were rated as non-neutral. Linking the 
directionality of the facts to the specific (directional) trivia statements participants in Experiment 
4B received, facts were further classified as “objectively favorable” or “objectively unfavorable.” 
For example, if the trivia in experiment 4B stated that “the temperature is ABOVE 66 degrees,” 
facts which were rated as “objectively more” in the control survey became “objectively favorable.” 
This set of transformations allowed us to compare how the facts were interpreted in 
contexts where the individuals were, or were not, using the information towards financial gain. Of 
the facts rated as objectively favorable in the control evaluation, 50% were also rated as favorable 
by participants in the lab gambling task. In contrast only 38% of the facts rated “unfavorable” by 
controls were rated unfavorable by the “gamblers”. This difference is highly significant (p<.01) 
supporting a motivated bias against the integration of unfavorable information (see Appendix 
Section 6 for additional detail). This final study shows that though the simple model of ambiguity 
aversion does relatively well at describing the effects of information on valuations of AFPs there 
are environments where a key assumption of this model is violated. Notably, the direction of this 
finding would be expected to amplify the asymmetry observed in the poker chip studies.  
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Integrating these two biases in different settings, and finding the boundary conditions on the 
“subjective” phenomenon will be an important direction for future work. 
 
Discussion 
Significant work has been done in fields such as economics, psychology, and consumer 
behavior on how individuals process information in various types of decisions (e.g. Lord et al. 
1979, Peeters & Czapinski 1990, Jain and Maheswaran 2000, Baumeister et al. 2001, Russo et al. 
2004, Rozin & Royzman 2006). These findings however, have conflicting predictions about 
whether and how information processing might be biased in uncertain settings, where information 
is known to be incomplete. Our experiments are able to disentangle these different hypotheses 
and add to the rich literature specifically addressing ambiguity (Ellsberg 1961, Camerer & Weber 
1992, Halevy 2007, Maafi 2011, Trautmann et al. 2011, Trautmann & van de Kuilen 2013, 
Oechssler and Roomets 2013 etc.) by focusing on the effects of independently varying the 
amounts of favorable and unfavorable information in uncertain contexts.  
Building from a simple model of ambiguity aversion, we demonstrate that when 
information is incomplete, favorable information can affect the valuations of financial prospects 
much more strongly than unfavorable information. While this net behavioral finding appears 
consistent with a general overweighting of favorable information, experiment 5 provides evidence 
for a more complex set of mechanisms corresponding to (or predicted by) our mathematical 
representation.  Specifically, in line with H2, H3a, and H3b, we find that both estimated 
likelihood of a positive outcome and subjective certainty affect evaluations of ambiguous 
financial prospects.  
Interestingly, we additionally found evidence for non-Bayesian overweighting of 
favorable information in line with H4.  However, this occurred in trivia games where information 
required subjective interpretation. Despite similar behavioral outcomes, findings from the poker-
chip games did not reflect such biased processing.  One possibility is that this occurred due to the 
more concrete (less “interpretable”) nature of the numerical information in the poker chip games.  
This distinction offers a useful direction for future theoretical studies related to incorporating 
biased integration into economic models of uncertainty.  
Situations that do lead to overweighting favorable information may also involve 
additional mechanisms. For example, individuals might be considering favorable information first, 
since it’s best matched to the eventual goal. Thus a mechanism like query theory (Johnson, Haubl 
& Keinan, 2007, Weber et al. 2007) would predict that initial cognition related to favorable 
information could overshadow later consideration of unfavorable information, contributing to the 
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observed behavioral bias. As a whole these findings point to a number of important future 
empirical research directions such as understanding what “types” of information and what types 
of uncertain contexts are more or less likely to result in biased integration.  
It is perhaps surprising that these results provide little evidence for negativity biases, or 
an overweighting of unfavorable information, even when gambles were presented in the domain 
of loss.  Instead, our findings support potential benefits of unfavorable information related to its 
role in reducing uncertainty. Individuals may be more likely to abstain from making a choice in 
the face of general uncertainty about a situation (e.g. Ritov and Baron 1990) or in a situation 
where the outcome is not yet resolved (Tversky & Shafir 1992, Shafir 1994).  For example, 
experiments done by Tversky & Shafir (1992) showed that students were interested in taking a 
vacation if they imagined they had passed an exam, or if they had failed it.  Despite both 
outcomes leading to the same anticipated action, students overwhelmingly expressed a preference 
to delay such a choice until after the exam’s outcome was known. Building on this, our data 
suggests that moderate amounts of unfavorable information could aid in encouraging individuals 
to take needed or helpful actions rather than withdrawing from potentially useful or necessary 
choices.  This could be extended further to market-level benefits in finance where even “bad 
information” might still be useful information in helping to stabilize future choices by reducing 
immediate uncertainty.  
To allow individuals to express how differing levels of favorable and unfavorable 
information changed their valuation of a gamble (AFP), our experiments generally used 
measurements of willingness-to-pay (WTP). Recent work has shown that the overall degree of 
ambiguity aversion can vary across elicitation measures (e.g. Trautmann et al. 2011). Indeed, 
Trautmann et al. (2011) show that WTP can be biased downwards (overestimating the degree of 
ambiguity aversion) due to loss-aversion. An overall decrease in WTP across our game rounds (as 
in a loss aversion “main effect”) could still allow for asymmetries in the effects of favorable and 
unfavorable information to be detected, though it might influence effect size.  It is also 
noteworthy that the observed asymmetries persist in the domain of losses (experiment 3), and 
when a fixed ticket price is used (experiment 5).  However, to best understand the expression of 
our effects, it will be important to extend these studies to other types of ambiguous situations, 
such as tradeoff choices between ambiguity and risk.  
In our study design, individuals make multiple decisions across several levels of 
knowledge.  We demonstrate that this experience does not decrease our effects on valuation in 
experiment 5. However, it is possible that this experience could increase the impact of uncertainty 
compared to a single choice in which individuals may not have developed a sense of how they 
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feel about varying levels of information.  This potential limitation echoes the work of Fox and 
Tversky (1995), who demonstrate that aversion to ambiguity is dependent on recognizing one’s 
comparative ignorance. As suggested by experiment 5, individuals who do not feel uncertain 
would be expected to have a different behavioral profile, more aligned with sensitivity to risk.  
Experiment 3 suggests that even while favorable information is being overweighted, 
individuals in our ambiguity task show risk-seeking behavior consistent with loss aversion.  
However, it is unclear how the mechanisms revealed by our experiments in ambiguous contexts 
might interact with other types of biases observed in risk-based choice (e.g. Tversky & 
Kahneman 1992).  In addition, there have been significant recent advances made in understanding 
ambiguity aversion and estimating value under risk versus ambiguity at the neural level (Hsu et al. 
2005, Huettel et al. 2006, Levy et al. 2010). Thus we believe there is a rich potential for future 
studies using methods from behavioral economics and neuroscience to better understand the 
mental processes involved, and how our effects can be integrated with previous findings.   
Many important decisions, such as evaluating the future value of a house or a derivative 
contract, involve the integration of partial information into the valuation process. Uncertainty is 
similarly influential in consumer decisions about medical care (Ritov & Baron, 1990) or even 
brand selection (Muthukrishnan et al. 2009.)  Furthermore, tolerance (or aversion) for ambiguity 
can play an important part in how a firm’s organizational and leadership decisions develop (e.g. 
Camerer & Weber 1992, Schere 1982). Our findings imply that standard models of choice under 
uncertainty may not accurately predict behavioral responses to incoming information in such 
choices.  Furthermore, in many cases, such individual choices have important aggregate 
consequences such as influence on market prices (Sarin & Weber 1993, Epstein & Schneider 
2010, Guidolin & Rinaldi 2013).  Thus our results have the potential to enhance both a 
psychological understanding of behavior as well as economics models with importance at the 
micro and macro levels. 	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Tables 
Table 1: Summary of Experimental Studies 
Experiment Paradigm Incentives Favorable 
Information 
Unfavorable 
Information 
1  Pull-a-chip: gains 
AMT (n = 100) 
Hypothetical 
Win = $50 
# red (winning) 
chips 
 
# blue (no-win) 
chips 
2  Pull-a-chip: gains, 
choice of winning 
color  
AMT (n = 111) 
Hypothetical  
Win = $50 
# chips of chosen 
(winning) color, 
defined on each 
round 
# chips of unchosen 
(no-win) color, 
defined on each 
round 
3  Pull-a-chip: losses  
AMT (n = 53) 
Hypothetical  
Win = Retain $50 
endowment 
# of red (no-loss) 
chips 
# blue (lose) chips 
4A  Pull-a-chip: gains 
Majority : gains 
In lab (n= 37) 
Incentive 
compatible 
Win = 30 points 
($7) 
# red (winning) 
chips 
#blue (no-win) 
chips 
4B  Trivia : gains,  
subjectively 
interpreted 
information 
In lab (n = 27) 
Incentive 
compatible  
Win = 30 points 
($7) 
# supporting facts, 
as designated by 
participant 
# contradicting 
facts, as designated 
by participant 
5  Pull-a-chip: gains, 
estimates of 
likelihood and 
certainty 
In lab (n=29) 
 
Incentive 
compatible  
Win = $30 
# red (winning) 
chips 
# blue (no-win) 
chips 
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Table 2: Average marginal effects of favorable and unfavorable information on WTP in 
experiments 1-3. 
 Ex 1: Gain 
Frame 
Ex 2: With 
Choice 
Ex3: Loss 
Frame 
#favorable 0.133 0.104 -0.077 
 (0.014)*** (0.015)*** (0.014)*** 
#unfavorable -0.006 0.014 0.027 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.018) 
constant 4.553 5.084 18.214 
 (0.564)*** (0.531)*** (1.591)*** 
R2 0.12 0.07 0.02 
    
N 900 999 477 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the participant level. 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Table 3: Experiment 4: Average marginal effects of favorable and unfavorable information on 
WTP across game types. 
 Pull-a-Chip 
Game 
Majority 
Game 
Trivia  
Game 
#favorable 0.136 0.099 7.353 
 (0.015)*** (0.014)*** (1.005)*** 
#unfavorable -0.058 -0.012 -2.906 
 (0.014)*** (0.009) (0.939)** 
constant 6.504 6.362 7.418 
 (0.738)*** (0.646)*** (0.774)*** 
R2 0.23 0.14 0.24 
N 332 333 370 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the participant level. 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Table 4: Experiment 5 Results: WTP conditional on amounts of favorable and unfavorable 
information (col. 1), and when restricted to the final 25 rounds (col. 4). Willingness to purchase 
conditional on amounts of favorable and unfavorable information (cols. 2 and 3). 
 
  WTP Purchase, 
Probit 
Purchase Binary,  
LPM 
WTP, Last 
25 rounds 
 #favorable 0.107 0.036 0.011 0.105 
  (0.012)*** (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.014)*** 
 #unfavorable -0.028 -0.012 -0.003 -0.024 
  (0.011)* (0.004)** (0.001)** (0.010)* 
 constant 1.685  0.078 1.706 
  (0.491)**  (0.052) (0.486)** 
 R2 0.30  0.29 0.24 
 N 1,450 1,450 1,450 725 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the participant level. 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Table 5: Experiment 5  Likelihood of a winning outcome and felt certainty increase willingness 
to pay as well as willingness to purchase decisions. 
 
  WTP Purchase 
(Probit) 
Purchase Binary 
(LPM) 
 likelihood 1.523 0.559 0.176 
  (0.177)*** (0.066)*** (0.013)*** 
 certainty 0.452 0.108 0.049 
  (0.126)** (0.042)** (0.012)*** 
 constant 2.053   0.107 
  (0.720)**   (0.075) 
 R2 0.31  0.35 
 N 1,450 1,450 1,428 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the participant level. 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Table 6: The impact of information on estimated likelihood is directional dependent on valence. 
However, both favorable and unfavorable information increase felt certainty. Coefficients from 
ordered Probit regressions. 
 
 Likelihood 
Red 
Certainty 
numred 0.043 0.024 
 (0.008)*** (0.003)*** 
numblue -0.045 0.029 
 (0.008)*** (0.003)*** 
N 2,900 2,900 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the participant level. 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
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Figure	  1:	  Experiment	  1	  WTP	  for	  pull-­‐a-­‐chip	  games	  with	  partial	  information.	  The	  effect	  of	  incrementing	  favorable	  information	  (seen	  in	  the	  differing	  colors)	  is	  significantly	  larger	  than	  the	  effect	  of	  incrementing	  unfavorable	  information.	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Figure	  2:	  Experiment	  4b.	  A)	  Example	  of	  trivia	  game	  round	  with	  two	  facts	  present.	  B)	  WTP	  for	  trivia	  games	  by	  subjectively	  reported	  information	  conditions.	  	  
	  	  	  
TRIVIA 1 
 
This ticket is worth 30 Points if the following is true: 
 
According to the Old Farmer’s Almanac, the high 
temperature in San Diego, California on April 28, 
2010 was ABOVE 66 degrees. 
 
FACT: According to the Old Farmer’s Almanac, since the 
1970’s the average high temperature in April in San 
Diego, CA was 68 degrees. 
 
FACT: According to the Old Farmer’s Almanac, the high 
temperature in San Diego on April 26, 2010 (two days 
before) was 62.6 degrees. 
B 
A 
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Figure	  3:	  Channels	  by	  which	  information	  affects	  willingness	  to	  pay	  for	  AFPs.	  
Favorable 
Info 
Unfavorable 
Info 
Estimated 
Likelihood 
Subjective 
Certainty 
WTP 
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Figure 4: Experiment 5 Mean WTP across randomly generated AFPs. X-axis shows the amount 
of favorable information (# chips of the winning color) with lines disaggregated into rounds with 
high or low amount of unfavorable information. Lines are locally estimated regressions with 
shaded 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 5: Experiment 5 A. Positive effect of estimated likelihood of a good outcome on WTP. B. 
Positive effect of subjective certainty on WTP. Error bars represent unclustered standard errors. 
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